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11 Introduction
In the pursuit of a sustainable economy, innovation has a crucial role to play.
Inducing technological progress that reduces damage to the environment
per unit of output is at the heart of modern environmental policy. Hence,
the dynamic performance of environmental regulation depends both on the
incentives it creates to adopt existing advanced technologies (Milliman and
Prince 1989, Jung et al. 1996, Requate and Unold 2003) and on the degree
to which they stimulate R&D.1
The latter link so far has been explored only by a small number of pa-
pers. In a two-period, competitive output market model Laﬀont and Tirole
(1996) study a very speciﬁc type of innovation where the new technology is
perfectly clean. In this situation permits achieve static eﬃciency but com-
pletely expropriate the patent holding ﬁrm if the government can adjust
policy after innovation has occurred. This type of analysis has been ex-
tended by Denicol` o (1999). He considers a more general type of innovation
where the new technology still emits pollution but has a lower emission-
output ratio. Since private costs of production are assumed to be the same,
the new technology is strictly superior to the established one. For the case
without pre-commitment by the government and an exogenous quality of
innovation he establishes the following results: Both taxes and permits im-
plement the static ﬁrst best allocation and induce positive and identical
R&D incentives.2 Fischer et al. (2003) concentrate on inﬂexible policies but
informally conﬁrm the equivalence result if the government is able to ad-
just regulation in the post-innovation period. In a recent paper, Requate
(2005a) studies a situation with heterogeneous ﬁrms where partial adoption
is socially optimal. In the case where policy adjustment is possible he ﬁnds
that neither taxes nor permits are able to implement the static ﬁrst best
allocation due to monopoly pricing by the patent holding ﬁrm. Moreover,
the two instruments are no longer equivalent. This contrasts the case of
pure adoption, i.e. without patents, where permits always implement the
optimal mix while taxes create multiple equilibria of which only one is eﬃ-
cient (Requate and Unold 2003). The literature has so far focused on very
speciﬁc types of innovation and both static and dynamic eﬃciency of market
based instruments is under debate.
The present paper contributes on the one hand by introducing a new type
of innovation into the literature and thereby complementing the existing
papers. On the other hand, it is shown that some of the results found carry
over to the existing literature and qualify previous ﬁndings.
All previously mentioned papers have in common that the innovation
process considered is vertical: Goods and pollutants produced by new tech-
1See Requate (2005b) for a recent review.
2The case considered by Laﬀont and Tirole (1996) is a special case where the equiva-
lence still holds but research incentives are zero.
2nologies are identical to those produced by old technologies, though emis-
sions per unit of output are lower. Hence, unless the installation of the new
technology involves real costs or ﬁrm heterogeneity (as in Requate (2005a))
complete adoption is optimal.
In practice, however, new technologies are often associated with new
threats to the natural environment and human health. The development of
technologies that reduce or eliminate existing types of pollution while caus-
ing new types of damages is frequently more realistic. In what follows, this
type of innovation is referred to as horizontal environmental innovation. If
the damages caused by established and new pollution types are suﬃciently
diverse as not to interfere with each other horizontal environmental innova-
tion is nonetheless desirable. Given that marginal damages of each emission
type are increasing, a mix of pollutants reduces marginal damages and en-
hances welfare.
Horizontal environmental innovation is very common. Most end-of-pipe
technologies ﬁt into this category. In automobiles catalytic converters re-
duce emissions of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide but at the cost of
higher sulphur oxide concentrations (Tietenberg 1992). Hydrocarbons are
precursors of low level ozone, carbon monoxide is poisonous to humans and
sulphur oxides cause acid rain. Scrubbers and electrostatic precipitators
remove lead and particulate matter (PM) from exhaust air by converting
them into waste water or solids.3 Harrison and Antweiler (2003) ﬁnd that
the Canadian industry has made extensive use of end-of-pipe solutions and
that signiﬁcant shifts in the composition of pollution has occurred during
the nineties.
In addition to end-of-pipe technologies, a number of innovations altering
the production process itself or allowing input substitution constitute a hor-
izontal environmental innovation. Chloroﬂuorocarbons (CFCs) blamed for
the depletion of the ozone layer were once introduced to abandon their poi-
sonous predecessors used in refrigeration. The Montreal Protocol eﬀectively
banning CFC production induced intensive research in substitutes such as
so called HCFCs.4 Although their ozone depleting potential is much lower
than that of CFC, some (e.g. HCFC-123) are suspected to cause cancer
and decay products like triﬂuoroacetic acid are toxic to humans and plants.
Other examples include petrol and diesel engines used in cars, chlorine5 and
energy production.
Despite its practical importance, horizontal environmental innovation
has received little attention in the economics literature so far. Moslener and
Lange (2004) compare the prospects of a new technology with initially un-
certain environmental eﬀects to an established one that causes well known
3See Greenstone (2003)
4The-Economist (1992)
5See Snyder et al. (2003)
3damages. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a new polluting technology
to be desirable have recently been derived by Winkler (2005). Both Moslener
and Lange (2004) as well as Winkler (2005) concentrate on socially optimal
solutions. There is also a related growth literature where technologies using
diﬀerent environmental resources compete (Chakravorty et al. 1997) or inno-
vation creates a new damage (Bretschger and Smulders 2001). However, the
optimal mix of diﬀerent damages that is central to horizontal environmental
innovation is not considered.
In the tradition of Laﬀont and Tirole (1996), Denicol` o (1999) and Re-
quate (2005a) the present paper studies how taxes, permits and patents
perform in regulating externalities and stimulating research, respectively.
In contrast to the previous literature, this is done in the case of horizontal
environmental innovation. However, some results have also important impli-
cations for vertical environmental innovation. The analysis concentrates on
static post-innovation eﬃciency and the research incentives created. Explicit
welfare rankings of instruments are not possible in the general framework
used.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up
the model. The social optimum is derived in Section 3. Section 4 ana-
lyzes permits, while taxes are treated in Section 5. Section 6 compares the
performance of instruments. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
As in Denicol` o (1999), consider two succeeding periods in a competitive
market for a non-durable consumption or intermediate good Y . In the ﬁrst
period only one production technology, denoted by the subscript 1, is avail-
able. If the research ﬁrm successfully engages in R&D, a second technology,
denoted by the subscript 2, producing a perfect substitute to Y and emitting
a second type of pollution becomes available in period 2.6 In Section 5.2 the
assumption of perfect substitutes is relaxed for a special case. The market’s
downward sloping inverse demand function in each period is
P = P (Y )
where Y = Y1 + Y2 is the sum of technologies output.
Individual ﬁrms have U-shaped cost functions and are assumed to be
small. Entry into the market is free. The industry’s aggregate cost function
is
C (Y1,Y2) = ¯ C1 (Y1,Y2) · Y1 + ¯ C2 (Y1,Y2) · Y2
6The assumption of perfect substitutes is realistic if the new technology is an end-of-
pipe equipment or as far as consumers do not care about the origin of the electricity they
use, the type of refrigant that cools their food and the type of fuel used by their cars.
4where ¯ Ci (Y1,Y2) are non-negative and non-decreasing in both arguments
and ∂ ¯ Ci
∂Yi ≥
∂ ¯ Cj
∂Yi . Hence, a marginal increase in output of the own technology
increases average costs at least as much as a marginal increase in output of
the other technology.
Each technology i emits pollution as a joint product at a constant ratio
to output Yi. Technology 1 - the established one - produces only emissions
of type 1. The new technology 2 emits less or no of emission type 1 per unit
of output and - this point is central to this paper - emissions of type 2. The
social damage function D is assumed to be of the following form
D(Y1,Y2) = D1(Y1 + α · Y2) + D2(Y2) with 0 ≤ α < 1
where both D1 and D2 are increasing and convex. α is an exogenous
parameter indicating by how much technology 2 is cleaner than technology
1 with respect to emissions of type 1. In a richer game, the research ﬁrm
can be expected to have some inﬂuence - but also uncertainty - on α. In
what follows, it is assumed that the type of the new technology is common
knowledge and not subject to strategic consideration by the research ﬁrm.
By adding D1 and D2 the environmental damages of emission types are
assumed to be independent, i.e. they do not increase or oﬀset the damage
done by the other pollutant. This form of the damage function allows on
the one hand perfect horizontal environmental innovation where the new
technology emits emissions of type 2 only (i.e. α = 0) and on the other
hand comes arbitrarily close to vertical environmental innovation if D2 is
very small compared to D1.
In the ﬁrst period research is undertaken by a single research ﬁrm. The
probability ρ that the new technology is available in period 2 is a function of
the eﬀort R put into R&D (with ρ(0) = 0,ρ0 > 0,ρ00 < 0 and limR→∞ ρ(R) =
1) measured by the ﬁrm’s research expenditure.
In what follows, production and emission control in period 1 are ignored
as there is nothing new to be learned. In the ﬁrst period only the research
investment matters. If the research ﬁrm’s eﬀorts remain fruitless, nothing
changes compared to the ﬁrst period. However, if research is successful and
technology 2 becomes available in period 2 the timing is as in Laﬀont and
Tirole (1996) and Denicol` o (1999). After the new technology has arrived
and its properties are known, the benevolent government adjusts regulation
and grants a patent to the research ﬁrm. Regulatory adjustment is crucial
as otherwise horizontal environmental innovation allows to substitute a reg-
ulated pollutant for a non-regulated one. This clearly creates ineﬃciencies
(Devlin and Grafton 1994). Imitation of the new technology is ruled out.
Second, the research ﬁrm chooses the level of the license fee f. Third, ﬁrms
decide to enter or exit the industry, which technology to use and how much
to produce.
The government uses either two pollutant speciﬁc tax rates or a permit
quantity for each pollutant to regulate environmental externalities. The
5license fee set by the research ﬁrm is assumed to be linear in output of
technology 2. As ﬁrms are small, identical and produce at an optimal scale
this mimics a ﬁxed fee per ﬁrm adopting the new technology.
3 The Social Optimum
The social planner’s solution is presented as a benchmark in this section.
Moreover, the last subsection indicates how it could be implemented using
forms of research stimulation other than patents.
3.1 Static Post-Innovation Eﬃciency
Given the new technology has arrived, the social planner aims to achieve the
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deﬁning unique solutions Y S
1 and Y S
2 , where (1) is binding if technology
1 has a strictly positive output and (2) is binding if technology 2 has a
strictly positive output.
The use of both technologies at the same time is desirable if and only if
the marginal social cost of producing the ﬁrst unit by technology i is smaller
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6Condition (3) states that the established technology is not used exclu-
sively in the static optimum and hence is a necessary condition for innovation
to be desirable. Gains from innovation are more likely the lower the marginal
costs of production of the ﬁrst unit of output using technology 2, the more
the emission of pollution type 1 is reduced (i.e. the lower α) and the lower
the external damage caused by the ﬁrst unit of emission of pollution type 2.
Hence, for horizontal innovation to be beneﬁcial the marginal damage of the
ﬁrst unit of pollution of type 2 is relevant. The steepness of the marginal
damage curve is relevant in determining the size of the welfare gain only.
If condition (4) is satisﬁed the new technology is not clean enough to be
used exclusively in the static optimum. Note, that under perfect horizontal
innovation, i.e. when α = 0 conditions (3) and (4) are symmetric.
3.2 Dynamic Eﬃciency
Given that the social planner is able to implement the static optimum in
the second period, how much should be spent on R&D in the ﬁrst period?
The optimization problem is
max
R
W = −R + ρ(R) · ∆W
where ∆W is the welfare gain of innovation in period 2 and discounting
is ignored. The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is
ρ0(R) · ∆W = 1. (5)
This deﬁnes RS where the marginal beneﬁt from R&D equals the marginal
cost of research. Conditions (1), (2) and (5) fully specify the social optimum
under horizontal environmental innovation.
3.3 Implementation
In an ideal world where there are no restrictions on instruments used and
the benevolent government is able to make credible commitments, the social
optimum can be implemented using pollution speciﬁc permits ¯ E1, ¯ E2 and
an R&D prize.
The equilibrium of the production stage is determined by
P(Y ) = ¯ C1(Y1,Y2) + γ1
P(Y ) = ¯ C2(Y1,Y2) + αγ1 + γ2
Y1 ≤ ¯ E1 − Y2
Y2 ≤ ¯ E2
where ¯ Ci is the average cost of technology i and γi is the permit price
for emissions of type i. In equilibrium output is given by Y1 = ¯ E1 − α ¯ E2
7and Y2 = ¯ E2 and permit prices are γ1 = P(Y ) − ¯ C1(Y1,Y2) and γ2 =
(1−α)P(Y )+α ¯ C1(Y1,Y2)+ ¯ C2(Y1,Y2). Hence, the government can control
output of both technologies.
The optimal second period allocation can be implemented by setting
ES
1 = Y S
1 + αY S
2 , ES
2 = Y S
2 .
In addition, a research prize of size ∆W would induce the optimal re-
search eﬀort.
However, the use of a research prize involves at least two restrictive con-
ditions. First, the government has to credibly commit that it indeed pays
if the new technology arrives. Second, the size of the prize has to equal the
welfare gain of innovation and has to be known to the research ﬁrm in period
1. Otherwise, the level of research eﬀorts is ineﬃcient (see equation (5)).
Hence, either (a) the government has perfect information on the research
cost and success functions and perfect foresight on social costs of the new
technology, to correctly anticipate the welfare gain of innovation, or (b), it
is able to commit on a whole plan of research prizes contingent on properties
of the new technology and the research ﬁrm is able to anticipate the social
cost function of the new technology.
PROPOSITION 1. If the government is able to commit and either (a) or
(b) is satisﬁed, the ﬁrst best allocation given by (1), (2) and (5) can be im-
plemented using permit quantities ES
1 and ES
2 and a R&D prize of size ∆W.
In both (a) and (b), information and commitment requirements are sub-
stantial and restrictive. Hence, if the information and commitment ability
of the government is constrained, research prizes fail to implement the ﬁrst
best optimum. Theory (Wright 1983) and their widespread use suggest that
patents are usually better able to cope with these constraints. Commit-
ment on patent law is easier to make credible than speciﬁc levels of research
prizes, and information about future technologies can be private to inno-
vators. Of course, patents come at a cost. Granting monopoly power in
the post-innovation period is likely to cause distortions and research incen-
tives are not bound to equal the social gain of innovation. In what follows,
the analysis concentrates on how patents aﬀect static eﬃciency in the case
of horizontal environmental innovation in industries regulated by taxes or
permits.
4 The Market Equilibrium with Patents and Per-
mits
In this section patents stimulate research while tradeable permits are used to
regulate environmental externalities. The timing is as follows. After arrival
8of the new technology, the government issues emission permits E1 and E2 to
regulate pollution types 1 and 2, respectively. Second, the research ﬁrm sets
a linear license fee f taking permit quantities as given. In the last stage,
ﬁrms choose technologies and the market is cleared. The game is solved
backwards.
4.1 Production - 3rd Stage
The free entry equilibrium of the production stage is where price equals
average costs and permit constraints hold.
P(Y ) = ¯ C1 (Y1,Y2) + γ1 if Y1 > 0 (6)
P(Y ) = ¯ C2 (Y1,Y2) + αγ1 + γ2 + f if Y2 > 0 (7)
Y1 + αY2 ≤ E1 (8)
Y2 ≤ E2 (9)
where γ1 and γ2 are the equilibrium permit prices for pollution type 1





mined by (6)-(9). In what follows, it is assumed that permit quantities are
set such that they impose at least a weak constraint on output, i.e. given
a zero license fee at least one of (8) or (9) is binding. Otherwise, permits
have no eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes. The level of the license fee f deﬁnes
three situations with respect to the number and type of technologies used:
exclusive production by the established or the new technology and a mix of
technologies.
Technology 1 is used exclusively (Y
per
2 = 0) if and only if either E2 = 0
or if the average cost of the ﬁrst unit produced by the new technology
¯ C1(E1,0) + γ1 is at least as high as the average cost of the last unit of the
established technology ¯ C2(E1,0)+αγ1 +γ2 +f. Since Y2 = 0, γ2 = 0. γ1 is
deﬁned by (6). Hence, if the license fee is suﬃciently high, i.e.
f ≥ f
per(E1) = (1 − α)P(E1) + α ¯ C1(E1,0) − ¯ C2(E1,0), (10)
equilibrium quantities are Y
per
1 = E1 and Y
per
2 = 0.
Technology 2 is used exclusively if the average cost of the ﬁrst unit
produced by the established technology is at least as high as the average









+ αγ1 + γ2 + f (11)





= α−1E1 or by Y1 = 0, (7) and (9) if E2 = Emin. How
9the license fee threshold for exclusive production of the new technology is
deﬁned depends on if and which permit constraint on Y2 is binding.
If f is such that permit constraints on the new technology are not bind-




2 = 0 and (11) yields









which implicitly deﬁnes the upper bound fper
1 (E1,E2). Only the new
technology produces below this threshold.
If, however, the constraint is binding and if ˆ Y2(E1,E2,f) = E2, the maxi-
mum license fee consistent with exclusive production by the new technology
is
fper
2 (E2) = ¯ C1 (0,E2) − ¯ C2 (0,E2). (13)
If ˆ Y2(E1,E2,f) = α−1E1, (7) and (11) yield an upper bound on the
license fee
fper


















Hence, the conditions for exclusive production by the new technology
are summarized by





1 (E1,E2) : ˆ Y2(Emin,f) < Emin
fper
2 (E2) : ˆ Y2(Emin,f) = E2
fper
3 (E1) : ˆ Y2(Emin,f) = α−1E1
(15)
Furthermore, if α = 0 the new technology produces exclusively if E1 = 0
and E2 > 0. Equilibrium quantities are Y
per
1 = 0 and Y
per
2 = Y1(E1,E2,f).
In all cases where aggregate output is positive but neither (10) nor (15)
hold, i.e. fper < f < f
per, both technologies are used in equilibrium. Equi-
librium quantities are Y
per
1 = Y1(E1,E2,f) and Y
per
2 = Y2(E1,E2,f).
4.2 Setting of the License Fee - 2nd Stage
The patent holding ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts π = f · ˜ Y2 with respect to f given
the residual demand ˜ Y2(E1,E2,f) for the new technology. Output of the
new technology ceases to be restricted by permit constraints for license fees
above ˆ fper (E1,E2) deﬁned by
¯ C1(¯ Y1,Emin) + γ1 = ¯ C2(¯ Y1,Emin) + αγ1 + γ2 + ˆ fper. (16)
where either ¯ Y1 = E1−αEmin if the permit constraint is binding for the
ﬁrst pollutant or ¯ Y1 is determined by P
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: Emin = E1
α
P
 ¯ Y1 + Emin
− ¯ C2
 ¯ Y1,Emin
: Emin = E2
(17)
Note, that ˆ fper and f
per coincide only if E1 = 0. Furthermore, if Emin =
α−1E1 then fper
3 (E1) = ˆ fper. Hence, the residual demand for technology 2
is given by
˜ Y2 (E1,E2,f) =

   
   
Y2(E1,E2,f) : fper
1 (E1,E2) ≤ f ≤ f
per(E1)
ˆ Y2(E1,E2,f) : ˆ fper(E1,E2) < f < fper
1 (E1,E2)
Emin : 0 ≤ f ≤ ˆ fper(E1,E2)
0 : else
where Y2(E1,E2,f) and ˆ Y2(E1,E2,f) are implicitly deﬁned by (6) - (9)
and (7) - (9), respectively. The equilibrium can be of four types. The equi-
librium license fee fper is either a corner solution with fper = ˆ fper or fper =
fper













































4.3 Optimal Policy - 1st Stage
Anticipating the license fee choice of the patent holding ﬁrm and the mar-















In what follows, three cases are distinguished based on the number and
type of technologies active in the static social optimum. It can be ﬁrst best
(a) to use only the established technology (condition (3) does not hold), (b)
to use only the new technology (condition (4) does not hold) or (c) static
eﬃciency requires a speciﬁc mix of technologies (both (3) and (4) hold). For
11each of these cases it is analyzed under which conditions the government is
able to implement the ﬁrst best static allocation.
(a) Exclusive Use of the Established Technology
If the static optimum requires exclusive production by the established tech-
nology, two steps have to be taken to implement the optimal allocation. The
government has to rule out production by the new technology and given that,
implement technology 1’s optimal output.
The former is achieved by setting E∗
2 = 0. The problem therefore reduces
to equations (6) and (8). The static ﬁrst best output can be implemented
by E∗
1 = Y S
1 .
Patent holder’s proﬁt and therefore research incentives are zero. This is
dynamically eﬃcient since the new technology does not provide any social
gains (condition (3) does not hold).
PROPOSITION 2. If the new technology is not socially desirable, a govern-
ment using permits and patents is able to implement the ﬁrst best allocation.
This holds both from a static and a dynamic perspective.
(b) Exclusive Use of the New Technology
If in the static ﬁrst best allocation only the new technology produces, the
government aims to rule out production by technology 1 and control output
of technology 2. Both, however, is not always possible.
First consider the case where α = 0. Since the new technology emits only
pollution type 2, production by the established technology can be ruled out
by setting E1 = 0. The government’s problem reduces to one with one
technology and one pollutant where the former is owned by a monopolist,
i.e. the patent holder. There are situations in which monopoly pricing by
the patent holder restricts output of the new technology below the static
optimal level. In these cases quantity restrictions such as permits are, for










Y S ≥ 1, (22)













, is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition to achieve Y
per
2 = Y S
2 . Otherwise, the patent holding










and thereby restricts output below Y S
2 .
Inequality (22) is a condition on the price elasticity of the demand function.
It states that the monopoly quantity has to be larger than the static opti-
mum in order for the latter to be feasible under permits.
PROPOSITION 3.1 If the new technology is superior and α = 0, permits
implement the static optimum only if the corresponding output is below the
12quantity preferred by the patent holding ﬁrm (see condition (22)). Other-
wise, monopoly pricing excessively restricts output of the new technology.
If α > 0, i.e. the new technology emits both pollutants, E1 ≥ αY S
2 is
necessary to implement the static ﬁrst best. Hence, there is no way to
eﬀectively rule out production by technology 1 by permit constraints alone.
If permits on pollution type 1 are the relevant constraint for technol-
ogy 2 (i.e. E2 > α−1E1), emissions of type 2 are irrelevant for equi-
librium considerations in stages 2 and 3. The problem reduces to one
with two technologies and one pollutant. A special case of this situation
( ¯ C1(Y1,Y2) = ¯ C2(Y1,Y2) = c) has been analyzed by Denicol` o (1999). He
ﬁnds that the government can implement the static ﬁrst best allocation with
permits. However, his result depends on the implicit assumption that equi-
librium quantities are ﬁxed and hence, in equilibrium all permits are used
by the new technology.7 However, the patent holding ﬁrm sometimes can in-
crease proﬁts by raising the license fee above the threshold level ˆ fper = fper
which reduces output of the new technology and triggers production by the
established one (see appendix). This monopoly pricing results in three inef-
ﬁciencies. First, aggregate output is below the social optimum. Second, the
established technology produces although it should not. Third, marginal so-
cial costs of both technologies are not the same since the license fee is a pure
transfer. The condition that all permits are used by the new technology and










which is a condition on the price elasticity of the residual demand func-
tion ˜ Y2. The only diﬀerence to the case with α = 0 is that production by
the established technology is no longer ruled out (E1 > 0) and hence enters
production if the license fee is suﬃciently high.
Now, assume that permits on pollution type 2 are the relevant constraint
for technology 2 (i.e. E2 ≤ α−1E1). This does not increase the control of the
government on technologies output compared to the previous case. E2 can
only further restrict output of the new technology and thereby make things
worse. Hence, if α > 0, (22) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition that the
government is able to implement the static social optimum. It is also neces-
sary for the static equivalence of instruments and thereby qualiﬁes a result
by Denicol` o (1999). Monopoly pricing restricts the performance of permits
not only in the case studied by Requate (2005a). Moreover, both horizontal
environmental innovation and pure emission reductions are aﬀected by this
interaction between patents and permits.
7Fischer et al. (2003) also assume full adoption of the new technology.
13PROPOSITION 3.2 If the new technology is superior and α > 0, condition
(23) is necessary and suﬃcient to implement the static ﬁrst best allocation
with permits. Otherwise, monopoly pricing by the patent holding ﬁrm can
excessively restrict output of the new technology and thereby limit govern-
ment’s control on output.
Dynamic eﬃciency is not warranted. The optimal license fee fS that max-




Where ∆W is the welfare gain of innovation (see Section 3.2). The equilib-
rium license fee depends on Y S
2 and the slope of the demand curve in the
optimum. Properties of the established technology instrumental in deter-
mining the social gain of innovation and fS are irrelevant. Hence, in general
ftax 6= fS. The optimal license fee is not feasible in this case.
(c) Mix of Technologies
Assume that in the static optimum both technologies produce. Furthermore,
assume that E∗
1 = Y S
1 + αY S
2 and E∗
2 = Y S
2 . There is no combination of
permit quantities that is able to implement the static ﬁrst best, if this one
fails to do so. Both permit constraints are binding in equilibrium iﬀ the
following conditions hold












































Solving (24) for γ1 and substituting into (25) yields f
per













. Again, (26) is a restriction on the price elas-
ticity of the residual demand of the patent holding ﬁrm. If it holds, the
patent holding ﬁrm has no incentive to increase f and therefore reduce Y2
below Y S
2 in order to raise proﬁts.8 This is restrictive since it imposes an
upper bound on the slope of the residual demand curve in the static opti-
mum. (26) is a necessary condition for the feasibility of the static ﬁrst best
allocation. Together with (27) it is suﬃcient. If (26) does not hold there are
three types of ineﬃciency present. Aggregate output is too low, the relative
shares of technologies are distorted and marginal social costs of technologies
diﬀer.
PROPOSITION 4. If a mix of technologies is statically ﬁrst best, a govern-
ment using permits and patents is able to implement the optimal allocation
8Note, that (23) is a special case of (26) with Y
S
1 = 0.
14if and only if conditions (26) and (27) hold. Otherwise, monopoly pricing
by the patent holding ﬁrm limits the performance of emission permits.
However, in contrast to the case studied by Requate (2005a) with only one
pollutant where permits are never able to implement the optimal mix, with
horizontal environmental innovation this is possible under the conditions
presented above. The second pollutant characteristic for horizontal envi-
ronmental innovation generates an additional mean of controll available to
the government. Using two instead of only one permit quantity, the govern-
ment can impose diﬀerent restrictions on the two technologies and thereby
implement the static optimal mix at least in some cases. With respect to
government’s controll on output, horizontal environmental innovation is an
intermediate case between vertical innovation with one pollutant and patents
where permits are never optimal and pure adoption of advanced technologies
without monopoly power where permits always implement the eﬃcient mix
(see Requate and Unold (2003)).
Again, dynamic eﬃciency is not warranted. The optimal license fee fS
is a function of the pre-innovation welfare, i.e. when only the established
technology is used. The equilibrium license fee is not aﬀected by this and
hence in general fper 6= fS.
5 The Market Equilibrium with Patents and Taxes
In this section patents stimulate research while taxes are used to regulate
environmental externalities. First, the subgame perfect equilibria are de-
rived. Later subsections deal with the relevance of special cases and discuss
qualiﬁcations.
5.1 Solving the Game
The timing is as follows. After the new technology has arrived, the gov-
ernment uses linear emission taxes τ1 and τ2 to regulate pollution types 1
and 2, respectively. Second, the research ﬁrm sets the linear license fee f
taking tax levels as given. In the last stage, ﬁrms produce until price equals
average costs. The game is solved backwards.
5.1.1 Production - 3rd Stage
The free entry equilibrium of the production stage is determined by
P(Y ) = ¯ C1 (Y1,Y2) + τ1 if Y1 > 0 (28)
P(Y ) = ¯ C2 (Y1,Y2) + ατ1 + τ2 + f if Y2 > 0 (29)
where price equals average costs. The level of the license fee f again
deﬁnes three situations in with only the established, only the new or both
15technologies produce.
Technology 1 is used exclusively if and only if the marginal costs of the
new technology are above those of the established one. Hence, the license
fee has to be suﬃciently high, i.e. f > f
tax(τ1,τ2), where the threshold is
deﬁned by
P(Y t










+ ατ1 + τ2 + f
tax (30)
In this case the unique production equilibrium is given by Y tax
1 = Y1 (τ1)
and Y tax
2 = 0.
Technology 2 is used exclusively if and only if the marginal costs of the
new technology are below those of the established one. Hence, the license
fee has to be suﬃciently low, i.e. f < ftax(τ1,τ2), where the threshold is
deﬁned by
P(Y t










+ ατ1 + τ2 + ftax, (31)
The unique production equilibrium is given by Y tax
1 = 0 and Y tax
2 =
Y2 (τ1,τ2 + f).
In all other cases where aggregate output is positive both technologies
are used and both equations (28) and (29) hold. Equilibrium quantities are
Y tax
1 = Y1 (τ1,τ2 + f) and Y tax
2 = Y2 (τ1,τ2 + f).
5.1.2 Setting of License Fee - 2nd Stage
The patent holding ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts π = f · ˜ Y2 with respect to f given
the residual demand ˜ Y2 (τ1,τ2 + f) for the new technology. The latter is
derived from the equilibrium conditions of the production stage.




Y2 (τ1,τ2 + f) : ftax(τ1,τ2) ≤ f ≤ f
tax(τ1,τ2)
ˇ Y2 (τ1,τ2 + f) : 0 ≤ f < ftax(τ1,τ2)
0 : else
Note, that ftax and f





















, where Y t
1 and Y t






















is met to rule out cases where ftax > f
tax. However, both ftax and f
tax
can be zero or negative. If f
tax ≤ 0, the optimal license fee f is not uniquely
deﬁned (ftax ≥ 0) but equilibrium output of the new technology and hence
16patent holder’s proﬁt are zero anyway, because only the established technol-
ogy produces.
If f
tax > 0, the equilibrium license fee will never exceed f
tax since output
Y tax
2 and proﬁt π would be zero. This can not be proﬁt maximizing since a
license fee that just undercuts f
tax yields positive output and proﬁt.
There are four types of possible equilibrium license fee levels. The optimal
ftax can be an inner solution where only technology 2 produces, i.e. ftax is






ˇ Y2(τ1,τ2+ftax) = 1 with 0 < ftax < ftax. The second
equilibrium type where only the new technology is active is a corner solution
where ftax just undercuts the threshold ftax, i.e. ftax = ftax−. Third, the
proﬁt maximizing license fee can be an inner solution where both technolo-







with ftax ≤ ftax < f
tax. Last, a mix of technologies might result from an
equilibrium license fee equal to the upper bound f
tax. Note, that total dif-
ferentiating (31) or (30) and (31) and solving for ∂Y2
∂f and ∂ ˇ Y2
∂f , respectively
yields a residual demand of the new technology decreasing in the license
fee (∂ ˜ Y2
∂f ≤ 0). Inner solutions are therefore indeed possible. Second order
conditions are assumed to hold.
5.1.3 Optimal Policy - 1st Stage
Anticipating the license fee choice of the patent holding ﬁrm and the mar-


















In what follows, the same three cases as in Section 4.3 are distinguished
based on the number and type of technologies active in the ﬁrst best static
social optimum. For each case it is analyzed whether the government is able
to implement the ﬁrst best allocation.
(a) Exclusive Use of the Established Technology
If in the static optimum only the established technology produces, two steps
have to be taken to implement it. The government has to rule out pro-
duction by the new technology and given that, implement technology 1’s
optimal output.
If the new technology does not produce, the optimal tax on pollution type
1 is given by
τ∗
1 = P(Y S






17This ensures that the average cost of the established technology is such
that the ﬁrst best quantity Y S
1 is implemented given the new technology does
not produce. Hence, the second condition is met. To ensure that Y tax
2 = 0
the threshold f
tax(τ1,τ2) has to be less or equal to zero. Using (30) and
substituting in (33) this yields
τ∗
2 ≥ (1 − α)P(Y S











The government is able to implement Y tax
1 = Y S
1 and Y tax
2 = Y S
2 = 0.
Patent holder’s proﬁt and research incentives are zero. This is dynamically
eﬃcient since the new technology does not provide any social gains (condi-
tion (3) does not hold).
PROPOSITION 5. If the new technology is not socially desirable, a govern-
ment using taxes and patents is able to implement the ﬁrst best allocation.
This holds both for static and dynamic eﬃciency.
(b) Exclusive Use of the New Technology
If in the static optimum only the new technology produces, two steps have
to be taken to implement it. The government has to rule out production by
the established technology and given that, implement technology 2’s optimal

































+ (1 − α)τ1 − τ2. (37)
Equation (35) is the market clearing condition given only the new tech-
nology produces. Proﬁt maximization of the patent holding ﬁrm is repre-
sented in (36), while (37) ensures that the equilibrium license fee is below
the threshold ftax, i.e. that the established technology does not produce.



































Hence, there is a continuum of equilibria that implement the static ﬁrst
best allocation. In all these cases the equilibrium license fee is the same (see
equation (36)). In contrast to permits, where the patent holding ﬁrm is able
18to manipulate equilibrium price and output, this is not possible with taxes.
Using the tax rates on both pollutants the government can control the av-
erage costs of both technologies taking into account the proﬁt maximizing
behavior of the research ﬁrm. Denicol` o (1999)’s result on taxes therefore
can be generalized for cases with more general cost functions and multiple
pollutants.
If the license fee thresholds ftax and f
tax coincide there is an additional
set of eﬃcient subgame perfect equilibria. Given ftax = f
tax is positive it
imposes a binding upper bound on the equilibrium license fee. If ftax is a
corner solution and thereby just undercuts ftax, equation (38) becomes an
inequality. Together with (35) and instead of (36) and (37) the following






















+ (1 − α)τ1 − τ2 −  > f. (41)














Substituting (40) and (42) into (35), the optimal tax on pollutant 2 is
τ∗
























Note, that f will never be negative, hence there is a second condition on
the tax on pollutant 2
τ∗
















Given the license fee thresholds ftax and f
tax coincide there is an ad-
ditional continuum of static ﬁrst best subgame perfect equilibria with τ∗
1
deﬁned by (42), τ∗
















− α − τ∗
2, Y tax
1 = 0 and Y tax
2 = Y S
2 . Note, that the equilib-
rium license fee and hence patent holder’s proﬁts are a function of the tax
rate τ∗
2 which is not uniquely deﬁned.
Dynamic eﬃciency is not warranted whether the license fee thresholds
coincide or not. The optimal license fee fS that maximizes expected welfare,
including the R&D stage, is given by fS = ∆W
Y S
2
, where ∆W is the welfare
19gain of innovation (see Section 3.2). The equilibrium license fee is deter-
mined by equation (36) and depends on Y S
2 and the slope of the demand
curve in the optimum. Properties of the established technology instrumental
in determining the social gain of innovation and fS are irrelevant. Hence,
in general ftax 6= fS. Dynamic eﬃciency is not warranted.
If the license fee thresholds coincide there is an additional continuum of equi-
librium license fees. Although increasing the number of possible matches,
fS might still not be feasible. To see this, assume that demand is not too
elastic, the established technology is highly polluting and the new technol-
ogy produces at negligible costs and is very, though not entirely, clean. The
welfare gain of the new technology is therefore quite substantial, and so is
fS. The maximum equilibrium license fee ftax (τ2), however, is bound from




, in the absence of commitment
there is no way to warrant that the appropriate equilibrium is selected by
the government in the post-innovation period. Dynamic eﬃciency is there-
fore not warranted. Moreover, note that the continuum of equilibria always
includes ftax = 0. This is the case, if τ∗
2 = τ2. Hence, complete expropria-
tion of the patent holding ﬁrm is always possible, given ftax = f
tax.
PROPOSITION 6 If the new technology is superior to the established one, a
government using taxes and patents is able to implement the ﬁrst best static
allocation.
This contrasts the permit case where monopoly pricing by the patent hold-
ing ﬁrm restricted government’s control over the equilibrium allocation.
Monopoly pricing does occur with taxes but the government can accom-
modate it using tax rates to manipulate patent holder’s marginal revenue.
(c) Mix of Technologies
In order to implement the static ﬁrst best allocation if both condition (3)
and (4) hold the government has to rule out the exclusive use of one tech-
nology and given that induce the optimal mix of technologies Y S
1 > 0 and
Y S
2 > 0.
A necessary condition for a technology mix is that ftax ≤ ftax ≤ f
tax.
If the license fee threshold levels coincide, this condition is degenerated to
ftax = ftax = f
tax. The patent holding ﬁrm, however, strictly prefers a
license fee that just undercuts this threshold in order to supply the entire
market instead of only a fraction. Hence, the government has to impose a
lower bound on the license fee at ftax to implement the mix. The only way
to do this is to induce ftax = 0. In this case, however, the patent holding
ﬁrm does not earn any proﬁts regardless of its license fee choice. This has
two implications. First, the government is unable to warrant a mix of tech-
nologies as the patent holding ﬁrm might opt for zero output of technology 2
20instead of a zero license fee. Second, even if a zero license fee is chosen, any
mix is an equilibrium of which only one is eﬃcient. This situation is similar
to the one in Requate and Unold (2003) where adoption without patents
is analyzed. Third, anticipating the inability to recover expenditures the
research ﬁrm will not invest in the ﬁrst place. If the government conjectures
that the patent holding ﬁrm sets a positive license fee, if ftax = 0, it prefers
to implement a second best allocation where only the established or only
the new technology produces. Propositions 5 and 6 hold analogous.
PROPOSITION 7.1 If a mix of technologies is statically ﬁrst best and the
license fee thresholds ftax and f
tax coincide, a government using taxes and
patents is not able to implement the optimal mix of technologies. The second
best allocations are equivalent to the ﬁrst best allocations in either 5.1.3 (a)
or 5.1.3 (b) and can therefore be implemented.
Now consider the case where the license fee threshold levels do not coin-
cide (ftax < f
tax). Equilibria with an inner solution ftax ≤ ftax < f
tax or
a corner solution ftax = f
tax can exist. First, the case of an inner solution
is analyzed.
In order to implement the ﬁrst best static allocation the tax rates have to

































ftax ≤ f < f
tax. (46)
(43) and (44) ensure market clearing in the production stage, while (45)
originates from proﬁt maximization of the patent holding ﬁrm in the sec-
ond stage. Condition (46) ensures that both technologies are used and the














Substituting this into (44) the optimal tax on pollutant 2 is
τ∗






















Using the deﬁnitions of ftax and f
tax and (47) and (48), (46) yields the










































































. If (49) holds, there is a subgame perfect equi-
librium that implements the ﬁrst best static allocation. The government is
able to accommodate monopoly pricing by the patent holding ﬁrm by ap-
propriate choice of tax rates. However, this ability is limited by condition
(49). The following analysis of the corner solution equilibrium will show
that, given (49) holds, this equilibrium is unique.
In order to implement the ﬁrst best static allocation by a corner solution























+ (1 − α)τ1 − τ2 = f. (51)
Again, the optimal tax rate on pollution type 1 is given by (47). From
(50) and the fact that the license fee is never negative it follows that








This yields a range of optimal tax levels on pollutant 2 τ∗
2 ∈ (τ2,τ2]






























































It is possible to implement the ﬁrst best static optimum as a corner solu-
tion if and only if (52) holds. If this is the case, there is a continuum of equi-
libria with τ∗
1 given by (47), τ∗












1 = Y S
1 and Y tax
2 = Y S
2 . Note, that for one of these equilibria ftax = 0
and research incentives are therefore zero.
PROPOSITION 7.2 If a mix of technologies is statically ﬁrst best and the
license fee thresholds ftax and f
tax do not coincide, a government using
taxes and patents is able to implement the static optimal mix of technologies
if and only if either (49) or (52) hold. If (49) holds, the subgame perfect
22equilibrium is unique and provides strictly positive research incentives. If
(52) holds, there is a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria that includes
one where research incentives are zero.
If (49) or (52) do not hold, the government is not able to implement
the ﬁrst best mix of technologies. The second best quantities Y sec
1 and Y sec
2
maximize (32) subject to the condition that either (49) or (52) hold for the
second best quantities or only one technology produces.
Again, in contrast to the situation with one pollutant considered by Re-
quate (2005a) where taxes never implement the optimal mix, with horizon-
tal environmental innovation this is possible under the conditions presented
above. The second tax rate, feasible due to the diﬀerentiation of pollutants,
allows the government to individually address technologies in its regulatory
eﬀort. This results in improved controll and in more eﬃcient allocations.
5.2 The Relevance of Coinciding License Fee Thresholds
In the previous subsection the case where license fee thresholds ftax and f
tax
coincide diﬀered substantially from the general case. Similar to Requate and
Unold (2003) the government is never able to implement a speciﬁc mix of
technologies (Proposition 7.1). Moreover, all equilibria are characterized by
exclusive production by one technology. If only the new technology pro-
duces, there is a continuum of equilibria including one with zero research
incentives. Hence, research incentives depend crucially on the conjectures of
the research ﬁrm on governments choice of τ∗
2 and therefore predictions on
dynamic eﬃciency are hard to come by even if all parameters are known.
Is this case of any practical relevance? It is, since a number of cost func-
tions ﬁt into this category. As said before, ftax = f





















(see Section 5.1.2). This
holds if both technologies exhibit constant returns to scale at the industry
level, i.e. ¯ C1(Y1,Y2) = c1 and ¯ C2(Y1,Y2) = c2. Note, that this is in line with
the previous assumption that individual ﬁrms have U-shaped average cost
functions. Constant returns require that supply of all inputs is perfectly
elastic in the relevant range and that ﬁrms are small. Laﬀont and Tirole
(1996), Denicol` o (1999) and Requate and Unold (2003) restrict their analy-
sis to such situations.
More general technologies, where all inputs not in perfectly elastic supply
are shared by both technologies, ﬁt also into the relevant class. The cor-
responding cost functions ¯ C1(Y1,Y2) = ˆ C(Y1 + βY2) + c1 and ¯ C2(Y1,Y2) =
ˆ C(Y1 + βY2) + c2 satisfy the necessary condition.
End-of-pipe equipments like scrubbers or catalytic converters are typical ex-
amples of such technologies. According to Harrison and Antweiler (2003)
end-of-pipe technologies are of great practical importance in industry’s abate-
ment activities. The case where license fee thresholds coincide and hence
23static ineﬃciency of taxes is prevalent under horizontal environmental inno-
vation is of signiﬁcant practical relevance.
However, the results derived for coinciding license fee thresholds break














































+ ατ1 + τ2 + f























In contrast to the case with perfect substitutes, there are no cost func-
tions that in general satisfy this condition unless Y t
1 = Y t
2. Hence, if tech-
nologies produce imperfect substitutes coinciding license fee thresholds con-
stitute no longer a special case.
5.3 Unavailability of Subsidies
If the tax rates τ1 and τ2 on pollution types 1 and 2 respectively are restricted
to non-negative values, most of the propositions in this section break down.
The only exception is Proposition 5. Although the presence of negative
externalities alone require positive tax rates to internalize them, this does
not hold with two types of market failure. In order to correct monopoly
pricing by the patent holding ﬁrm and the externalities, negative tax rates
are necessary in the following cases.
The general stand-alone equilibrium in Section 5.3.1 (b) is aﬀected by an
unavailability of subsidies on pollution because τ∗
2 deﬁned by (39) becomes
negative if either the lower bound on τ∗
1 becomes to high or the marginal
change of the residual demand function evaluated at the optimal output
becomes too close to zero. The continuum of equilibria in the case that
ftax = f
tax can also vanish. τ∗
1 can be negative, given an adequate cost
function. Therefore Proposition 6 does not hold if subsidies are not avail-
able.
The invalidity of Proposition 6 also aﬀects the last sentence of Proposition
7.1. Second best allocations where the new technology produces exclusively
24are no longer warranted.
If a mix of technologies is statically ﬁrst best, the tax rate on pollutant 2
can be negative. This applies to both the inner and the corner solution
equilibria. Hence, if tax rates are bound to be non-negative, Proposition 7.2
does not hold.
The general performance of taxes is thus seriously reduced if subsidies are
not available. Note, that in this context subsidies might face special polit-
ical opposition. In contrast to the subsidies in the standard environmental
regulation literature they are not on abatement but on pollution.
6 Ranking of Instruments
Having analyzed the performance of taxes and permits under horizontal
environmental innovation individually, this section compares their relative
performance with respect to (a) static eﬃciency, (b) research incentives and
(c) welfare. However, in general the statements that can be made are very
limited.
(a) Static Eﬃciency
If the established technology is used exclusively in the static optimum, i.e.
condition (3) does not hold, both taxes and permits are able to rule out pro-
duction by the new technology. Thereby the problem of regulation reduces
to the standard textbook case of one technology and perfect information
where the equivalence of price and quantity regulation is well known.
If the new technology is used exclusively in the static optimum, only taxes
(not conﬁned to non-negative values) can implement it without further re-
strictions. Permits sometimes fail to achieve the static ﬁrst best due to the
ability of the patent holding ﬁrm to raise the license fee and thereby the
average costs of production above the optimal level. This reduces output of
the new technology below the ﬁrst best level and if α > 0 triggers produc-
tion by the established technology. Hence, taxes are preferred on grounds
of static eﬃciency.
If a mix of technologies is socially optimal, neither taxes nor permits im-
plement the optimal mix of technologies in all situations. Taxes can fail
for two reasons. On the one hand, the cost functions can be such that
the license fee thresholds coincide (see Section 5.2) or, on the other hand,
monopoly pricing restricts the government’s ability to implement the op-
timal mix (condition (49)). Permits also suﬀer from monopoly pricing by
the patent holding ﬁrm. The sets of ﬁrst best allocations that can be im-
plemented diﬀer between taxes and permits. In general, there is no clear
ranking of instruments. However, for speciﬁc cases such a ranking does exist.
25(b) Research Incentives
The incentives to undertake R&D are measured by the proﬁts of the patent
holding ﬁrm. In all cases where only the established technology is used in
the ﬁrst best allocation, both taxes and permits do not provide any research
incentives as is socially optimal.
If the new technology is used exclusively in the ﬁrst best allocation and both
instruments implement it, the ranking with respect to research incentives is











while with taxes it is deﬁned by (36).9 They
match only by coincidence. However, if license fee thresholds coincide un-
der taxes, there exist equilibrium license fees clearly lower than that under
permits since there is always an equilibrium with ftax = 0. In this case
multiplicity of equilibria makes predictions hard to come by. No ranking
of instruments with respect to research incentives is feasible when only the
new technology produces.
If a mix of technologies is ﬁrst best and this can be implemented, both taxes
and permits deﬁne unique license fee levels. Again, however, it is not possi-
ble to rank them.
(c) Welfare
Welfare rankings are even more blurred. Diﬀerent static ineﬃciencies and
problems to discriminate between excessive and under supply of R&D ren-
der a ranking of instruments impossible in general terms. However, both
instruments are ﬁrst best in cases where the new technology does not create
any social beneﬁts.
In order to compare the welfare eﬀects of taxes and permits in other cases,
more speciﬁc functional forms have to be assumed which in turn limit the
generality of results. However, using the results presented in this paper, this
can be done if an application justiﬁes speciﬁc functional forms and param-
eter values.
7 Conclusion
Horizontal environmental innovation, where new technologies reduce pollu-
tion of one type while causing a new type of damage, is highly relevant but
not suﬃciently considered in the economics literature so far. The present pa-
per considers such a situation to study the performance of taxes and permits
in regulating externalities in the presence of patents.
Both taxes and permits can implement the static optimum in a large
9Note, that the residual demand functions for Y2 diﬀer under taxes and permits. Hence,
no conclusions on f can be drawn from the proﬁt maximizing condition of the patent
holding ﬁrm.
26number of cases. This includes situations where both technologies are used
at the same time. Under vertical environmental innovation where only one
pollutant is emitted, this is not possible (see Requate (2005a)). In con-
trast to horizontal environmental innovation, there the government can not
diﬀerentiate its regulation across technologies.
However, both instruments sometimes fail to implement the static op-
timum. The performance of permits is restricted by their very nature to
impose upper bounds on quantities. Although environmental externalities
in general ensure that the social optimal output is below the unregulated
output this does not necessarily hold here. There is an additional market
failure in form of the monopoly created by patents. Hence, under certain
conditions the patent holding ﬁrm restricts output below the social optimum
by monopoly pricing. This creates up to three types of ineﬃciency: reduced
aggregate output, suboptimal mix of technologies and diﬀerent marginal so-
cial costs across technologies.
Taxes are less aﬀected by monopoly pricing because they directly target
prices instead of quantities. Ineﬃciency occurs only in situations where both
technologies should be used at the same time. If, e.g. there are constant
returns to scale at the industry level, taxes are not able to implement any
speciﬁc mix of technologies. This, however, is also the case in the absence of
patents (Requate and Unold 2003). Moreover, the optimal tax rate might
be negative and hence pollution (not abatement) has to be subsidized.
In addition to the new insights created for horizontal environmental in-
novation, the present paper qualiﬁes some previous results on vertical inno-
vation. It is shown that monopoly pricing is also an issue in situations with
only one pollutant and a strictly superior technology.
It is a general pattern that granting patents to induce private innovation
incentives triggers monopoly pricing by the successful research ﬁrm. This
in turn restricts the performance of economic instruments to regulate envi-
ronmental externalities in the post-innovation period. In itself, this is not
a surprising result. However, previous studies in this area have somewhat
obscured this fact by basically assuming it away. Both, the evaluation of its
empirical relevance and its eﬀect on the desirability of patents compared to
other instruments, await further research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Section 4.3
Assume that Y S
2 = α−1E1 < E2. This is the case considered by Denicol` o













is the unique equilibrium
of stages 2 and 3 and the government has therefore control over output of
the new technology. The static ﬁrst best can be implemented in this case.
27However, if the patent holding ﬁrm increases f above this threshold it faces
a residual demand ˜ Y2(f) implicitly deﬁned by
P(Y ) = ¯ C1 (Y1,Y2) + γ1
P(Y ) = ¯ C2 (Y1,Y2) + αγ1 + fper
Y1 + αY2 = E1.





















If marginal costs of production are constant (Denicol` o 1999), this re-






< 0. Hence, the patent holding ﬁrm can
increase proﬁts by raising f above ˆ fper and thereby trigger production of
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